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I. Introduction
Public interest in and attention to initial public offer-
ings (IPOs) has accelerated in recent years with the
boom in high-tech and Internet start-ups, many of
whose stock prices have skyrocketed. As a result, be-
ing listed on a public exchange is often featured prom-
inently in advertising and other marketing literature.
What really motivates firms to go public, and what
trade-offs are involved? In surveys the most frequently
mentioned motive for going public is to provide op-
timal access to capital markets in order to obtain new
finance.1 However, this explanation appears to have
difficulty in explaining the precise nature of the timing
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Michigan State University, North Carolina State University, Oxford
University, Stanford University, the European Finance Association
Conference in Vienna, and the Centre for Economic Policy and
Research conference in corporate finance in Lisbon. We thank the
participants for helpful discussions, especially Luis Cabral, Milton
Harris, and Yossef Spiegel. Comments from the editor and an anon-
ymous referee are also gratefully acknowledged. Contact: Neal M.
Stoughton (nmstough@uci.edu), Kit Pong Wong (kpwong@econ
.hku.hk), and Josef Zechner (josef.zechner@univie.ac.at).
1. See, e.g., the surveys discussed in Ro¨ell (1996).
Given recent public atten-
tion paid to high-flying
Internet IPOs such as Ya-
hoo and Amazon.com,
we explore a product
market motive for going
public. We develop a
model where consumers
discern product quality
from the stock price. The
model predicts that only
better-quality firms will
go public. Effects of IPO
announcements on rival
firms’ stock prices are re-
lated to inferences about
market size and market
share. The model also
predicts that the likeli-
hood of “hot issue” mar-
kets depends on the dis-
tribution of market size
uncertainty and the de-
gree of network externali-
ties present in consumer
preferences.
376 Journal of Business
of public offerings, as firms often have substantial cash in their balance sheet
prior to going public.2 Moreover, the prospectus is often rather uninformative
about this aspect as well, usually indicating that the proceeds of the issue are
to be used for “general corporate purposes.” In a similar vein, Pagano, Pinata,
and Zingales (1998) find in an empirical study of Italian IPOs that the need
to finance investment and growth has little power in explaining the likelihood
of IPOs.
This article explores the second most frequently given explanation for a
firm’s decision to go public, namely, that it enhances the company’s image
and publicity.3 It is easy to find anecdotal support for this motive. Edward
McVaney, chief operating officer of J. D. Edwards, commented that his (Sep-
tember 1997) IPO has led more corporate customers to start thinking of his
company as a valid ERP (enterprise resource planning) competitor. “Privately
held companies get no respect,” he stated (Brown 1997, p. 244).
In this article we formulate the intuition that being publicly traded can be
desirable by allowing for a product market motive to go public. Our model
depicts the interaction between information generated by informed speculators
and research analysts of a publicly traded firm and consumers who infer
product quality from the stock price. Going public provides a signal to con-
sumers that the firm is willing to subject itself to the scrutiny of outside
analysts who now have incentives to investigate the firm.4 In our model the
stock market is more than a certification mechanism.5 It also implies that a
large body of investors (security analysts) are actively engaging in the process
of price discovery.
We believe that the considerations identified in this article are especially
relevant for firms in high-tech industries where competitive dynamics are an
important consideration for long-term success. In this respect, being the first
firm to go public may convey strategic advantages relative to rival firms in
the same market segment.6 Empirical evidence of product market effects of
going public has been the subject of several recent articles. Slovin, Sushka,
and Ferraro (1995) document an average negative announcement effect on
rival firms (in the same four-digit SIC code). They found that the rivals’ stock
price reaction for equity “carve-outs” and for conventional IPOs was about
1% and was statistically significant.7 By contrast, Ward (1997) found that
the average effect of IPO announcements on rival firms depends on the motive
given in the prospectus. The product market explanation for going public also
2. For instance, one of the star performers of 1998, BroadCom, put the entire proceeds of
their offering into T-bills.
3. In addition to the aforementioned survey, this motive is documented in Ferrari (1992) and
Rydqvist and Ho¨gholm (1995) as well.
4. That is, outside analysts now substitute for inside monitoring by venture capitalists (Barry
et al. 1990).
5. See Boot and Thakor (1997) for a discussion of the importance of this function.
6. See Reinganum (1989) for a discussion of such product market models.
7. Slovin, Sushka, and Benedeck (1991) found that rival firms’ stock price reactions were
positive to a firm going private.
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extends to the international context. It may explain why some firms list their
shares on several foreign markets, for example, as American Depository Re-
ceipts on U.S. markets. Confirming the importance of product markets, Pa-
gano, Ro¨ell, and Zechner (2001) find that the propensity of firms to cross-
list their shares on a foreign market increases with the percentage of export
sales.8
The basic model we develop in the article features a stock market equilib-
rium model with a previously unexplored two-way effect. Consumers infer
quality from the stock price, and the stock market rationally anticipates profits
generated by the quality perceptions of consumers. The model also allows for
demand path dependencies to capture network externalities. More precisely,
the consumers’ willingness to buy the good in the future periods may be
positively related to the product quality as perceived when the stock begins
trading.
We find that there exist separating equilibria in which firms above a critical
quality level decide to go public, whereas firms with low quality levels stay
private. High-quality firms are willing to pay for information acquisition in
the stock market, since they benefit through better quality reputation in the
product market. The propensity to go public depends on the growth in market
size generated by network externality effects. We also show that such effects
limit the degree to which entrepreneurs and venture capitalists can “sell off”
their holdings. In this setting, IPOs imply stock price reactions of rival firms
in the industry. Generally, announcing an IPO is bad news for competitors
since this signals a higher product quality to consumers and, thus, lowers the
price that competitors can charge for their products.
As an important alternative to going public, firms may signal their quality
through the price they charge to consumers. This requires that marginal costs
of production differ across firms with different product quality. We develop
a related model to compare this alternative to signaling via going public. The
analysis demonstrates that IPOs are preferred by high-quality types if network
externalities are stronger and when the difference between production costs
is small.
Initial public offerings have been the subject of a substantial amount of
research in the finance literature. Yet, the interactions between the IPO decision
and the product market have largely been ignored. Existing literature on IPOs
can be classified in one of three categories. First, there is a class of work that
analyzes IPOs but takes the firms’ need to go public as given. In these models
an investment project must be funded by going public and/or the entrepreneur
is risk-averse and wants to diversify. This class of work derives the equilibrium
pricing and equity issuance decisions given various kinds of informational
asymmetries. Examples of work in this category are the signaling articles of
Leland and Pyle (1977), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang
8. Blass and Yafeh (2001) look at a sample of Israeli firms that are only listed in U.S. markets
and characterize them as young, high-tech, and export-oriented.
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(1989), Welch (1989), and Cao and Shi (2000), as well as articles by Brennan
and Franks (1997), Stoughton and Zechner (1998), and Maksimovic and Pi-
chler (2001).
The second category of work endogenizes the decision of whether to go
public. Generally the alternative to the IPO considered in this literature is a
private equity issue. For work in this category, the reason why firms may
choose an IPO rather than a private equity issue is because of capital market
frictions. An IPO may minimize transactions costs involved with financing a
project but has no direct influence on firm fundamentals. For example, the
cost of information acquisition by shareholders, which is high in the case of
an IPO, must be traded off against the better risk-sharing opportunities that
a publicly placed stock issue creates. Examples of this strand of literature are
Zingales (1995) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999).
The third category of literature endogenously explains IPOs by their po-
tential direct effects on firm fundamentals. An IPO may result in optimal
monitoring by shareholders or may allow improved incentive contracts be-
tween the firm and the manager, and so on. For example, work by Holmstrom
and Tirole (1993), Maug (1997), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Pagano
and Ro¨ell (1998), and van Bommel (2000) falls into this literature category.
Our article also falls into the third category, but we focus on an effect on
firm fundamentals that has thus far been ignored: the effect of an IPO on the
firm’s consumers.9 In our model, firms do not necessarily need the stock market
to raise new capital but, rather, wish to obtain independent certification about
the quality of its products. This helps high-quality firms compete more ef-
fectively in the product market.
This article is also related to two strands of literature on industrial organ-
ization. First, it contributes to the literature on network externalities, stan-
dardization, and compatibility. As discussed in Farrell and Saloner (1985) and
Katz and Shapiro (1986), positive network externalities arise when consumers
derive additional benefits from the use of a good as the number of consumers
purchasing the same good or compatible ones increases. Emerging industries
such as Internet-based industries exhibit strong network externalities where
eventually few products dominate a market. Our model incorporates the in-
tertemporal nature of competition by featuring such network externalities. We
thus link the informational advantages of an IPO to the firm’s strategic position
in future periods.
A second strand of the economics literature deals with equilibrium price-
quality schedules for markets where product quality is unobservable (see Klein
and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983; Allen 1984; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; and
Judd and Riordan 1994). In their models of competitive firms, a quality pre-
mium (i.e., price above marginal cost) is called for to keep the firms from
cutting product quality, thereby milking their reputation. We include an al-
9. An interesting interpretation of our results is provided by the analogous extension to em-
ployees and input suppliers.
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ternative analysis of product price signaling versus signaling through the IPO
process and demonstrate an advantage to the latter for competitive industries
with low marginal costs of production.
The article is structured as follows. Section II introduces the model and
derives the results for the case of a single firm. In Section III we allow for
competition in the product market. Section IV compares signaling through
the product price with signaling by going public. Section V gives a summary
of results and highlights empirical predictions with particular attention to
cross-sectional industrial and competitive implications.
II. The Single-Firm Model
We develop the model first for a setting in which there is a single firm. The
model features several types of agents. A firm is in the process of deciding
whether to go public. If it goes public, the original owners retain a fraction
a of the equity and issue the fraction . The alternative to going public1 a
is obtaining private financing in order to implement the same investment and
production strategy.
If the firm decides to go public, it offers equity at a fixed price to a set of
uninformed investors who have rational expectations about future price move-
ments. Specifically, we assume that these uninformed investors later trade
with informed speculators once secondary trading opens.10 The value or profits
of the firm are related to consumers’ perceptions of the product quality sold
by the firm. Consumers make purchase decisions in two periods. In the first
period, assumed to be simultaneous with the introduction of secondary trading,
consumers use information about whether the firm made a public offering in
conjunction with the security price, if it exists, to infer the quality of the
product. The higher the quality, the greater is consumers’ willingness to pay,
which translates into higher profits for the firm. In the second period, con-
sumers know quality perfectly, presumably because of their purchase expe-
riences in the previous period. The total value of the firm at the time of the
IPO is determined by the sum of both first- and second-period profit. The
sequence of events is depicted in figure 1.
In deciding whether to go public, the firm has to consider the associated
cost along with the potential benefit. The cost in our model is related to
underpricing of the issue. The potential benefit is the fact that if the firm’s
stock is publicly held, consumers will be able to use the stock price as a
means to estimate the product quality. All agents in the model, the firm,
consumers, uninformed investors, speculators, and market makers, always
have rational expectations given their information sets and utilize the form
of the equilibrium in making decisions.
10. Chemmanur (1993) contains a more elaborate model with endogenous information pro-
duction by traders.
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Fig. 1.—Events in the model
A. The Basic Elements
The essential elements of the market microstructure model are the same as
in Kyle (1985). However, there is an additional ingredient in that a part of
the intrinsic value derives from inferences about product quality obtained from
the stock price.
At some initial time, t0, the firm learns its expected product quality, , and¯qi
decides whether to go public. The expected product quality is commonly
known to be distributed over the two-point support { }. For simplicity,¯ ¯q , qL H
we assume that the prior probability distribution establishes equal probability
for each of the two points, that is, the probability of . There¯ ¯q p q p 1/2L H
is a set of uninformed investors (i.e., who do not observe quality directly)
who purchase all of the IPO at the price p0.
The firm knows whether it has high expected quality, , or low expected¯qH
quality, , at the time of the IPO. We denote a firm that has high expected¯qL
quality as a “high type” and that of a low expected quality as a “low type.”
The final quality realization conditional on the firm’s inside information is
denoted by q and is random and distributed normally with mean ¯q i
and variance . The firm does not know the true quality level at2¯ ¯{q , q } jL H q
the time of the IPO.
At time t1, secondary trading begins, and a single informed speculator learns
the firm’s true quality, q. The speculator utilizes this information in deciding
on his trading demand, x. At this time, uninformed investors make portfolio
adjustments. While they expect to sell all of their holdings purchased in the
IPO, , the actual amount of their sales is random, because of factors1 a{ v
outside their control (e.g., endowment shocks).11 Whatever remains unsold
after time t1 is sold later in the second period. Specifically, uninformed traders
sell , where u is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero andv u
variance . Trades at time t1 are cleared through a market maker (arbitrageur)2ju
who observes the total order flow and realizes expected profit of zero. We
11. It can be shown that the results remain the same if uninformed investors expect to sell
only a fraction of the shares immediately and the rest later. For a model of endogenous informed
trading, see Khanna, Slezak, and Bradley (1994).
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assume that all agents are risk-neutral. The rational expectations equilibrium
price is denoted by p1.
Given observation of the secondary market price, consumers are willing
to pay a price for the good sold by the firm equal to in the firstqˆp E(q d p )1
period. That is, consumers are risk-neutral and are willing to pay a price equal
to their perceived quality given the observed stock price, p1. Each consumer
demands one unit of the good.
After the first round of product sales, quality is revealed. We assume that
the consumer’s willingness to pay in the second period increases with the
revealed quality. In addition, we consider a time-dependence effect whereby
the perceived quality from the first period increases the willingness to pay in
the second period. This represents the fact that consumers’ tastes in the second
period may exhibit path dependencies. Alternatively this can be interpreted
as a network externality effect. While the network externality is usually mod-
eled directly as a function of the number of consumers who purchase the
product (Katz and Shapiro 1986), we shall see in Section III, when competition
in the product market is considered, that a high perceived product quality in
the first period is generally associated with a larger market share. Specifically,
we assume that consumers pay an amount in the second period, whereˆq gq
is a coefficient representing intertemporal demand dependencies. Theg ≥ 0
specification considered can be motivated by experience and resource-specific
investments. For instance, suppose that the initial period perceived quality is
high for a particular software application. The consumer may then make
specific investments in that application so that, even if another application
appears better in the subsequent period, it is still better to stay with the original
software application.
It is worth pointing out that in this model product price cannot serve as a
signal of quality by itself. This is because the respective firm types have
identical production costs, and therefore any attempt by the high-quality firm
to signal through a higher price would be mimicked by the low-quality firm.12
However, we consider a related model in Section IV in which price signaling
is feasible.
The expected number of consumers in the first period and the second period,
respectively, is denoted by and M2. Before the IPO the financial market¯M1
regards the market size in the first period to be uniformly distributed with
mean and support [ ].13 Market size is assumed to be in-¯ ¯ ¯M M  s, M  s1 1 1
dependent of the distribution of product quality. We assume that the IPO
communicates the true size of the market in period 1, M1. For simplicity we
assume that the IPO process does not reveal new information about the long-
term size of the product market, M2.
12. That is, the well-known Mirrlees-Spence-Riley single-crossing condition is not satisfied in
our model.
13. Random market size is not important until the product market is introduced (in Sec. III).
382 Journal of Business
The secondary market price, p1, is established by the market maker to break
even:
p p M E(qFp )M [E(qFy) gE(qFp )],1 1 1 2 1
where is the total order flow observed by the market maker.y{ x v u
Thus, at time t1, the value of the firm is equal to the number of consumers
in the first period, M1, times the price they are willing to pay for the good,
given the stock price, , plus the expected second-period value con-E(qFp )1
ditional on observing the order flow.
B. Stock Market Equilibrium
In our model a rational expectations equilibrium is defined to be a set of
trades, market prices, and consumer conjectures at time t1 such that the spec-
ulator uses her inside information about the true quality and takes into account
the impact her trades have on market prices. Market makers use the information
implicit in order flow to establish market prices. Consumers use the infor-
mation implicit in market prices to estimate expected quality. We now derive
the functional form of the rational expectations equilibrium under the as-
sumption that only one type of firm goes public. As is commonly assumed,
we consider only the set of linear rational expectations equilibria, that is,
where demand of the speculator is linearly related to product quality, market
prices are linear in order flow, and consumer conjectures are linear in prices.
Let the expected quality of the type that goes public be . Then we can solve¯q
for the equilibrium demands of the speculator, x, the secondary market price,
p1, and consumer’s conjectures.
Proposition 1. Suppose that type goes public. Then, there exists a¯q
rational expectations equilibrium in which (i) the speculator’s demand sched-
ule is
ju
¯xp (q q); (1)
jq
(ii) the equilibrium stock price is
jq
¯p p [M M (1 g)] q (y v) , (2)[ ]1 1 2 2ju
(iii) the perceived first-period product quality is
1
qˆp p , (3)1M M (1 g)1 2
and (iv) the speculator’s expected revenue is
M2Rp j j . (4)q u2
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Proof. See Section I of the appendix.
With one exception, the derivation of this equilibrium follows standard
procedures and, therefore, is deferred to the appendix. The exception is that
consumers’ perceptions are an integral component of the price and are, in
turn, determined by the price.
Proposition 1 shows that the speculator’s demand is determined by whether
her observation of the true quality is above its expected value given that the
firm has gone public. The higher is the ratio of the standard deviation of
uninformed demand to the standard deviation of quality, the more significance
is placed on the observation by the speculator. The stock price is a linear
combination of expected quality conditional on going public plus the order
flow. In equilibrium, prices are partially informative about quality so that the
higher the stock price, the more consumers are willing to pay to purchase the
product.14 Finally, the speculator’s expected revenue is positively related to
the size of the product market in the second period and to the ex ante un-
certainty about product quality and uninformed trades. We note that the spec-
ulator’s profits do not depend on first-period product market sales. This occurs
because the speculator’s information is only valuable at the time true quality
is revealed in the second round of sales.
Since the uninformed traders purchase all of the IPO and then expect to
sell to the informed trader, the IPO price is reduced in anticipation of such
trades. This leads to IPO underpricing in our model.15 We now solve for the
amount of underpricing.
The uninformed investors sell to the informed speculator at time t1v u
and then sell their remaining holdings, u, at the end. Given competition be-
tween uninformed investors for the IPO, the cost of purchasing the shares at
the IPO price, , must be set to equal the expected revenue from(1 a)p0
future trades. That is,
¯ ˆ ˆ ¯(1 a)p p E[(1 a u)p Fq ] E{u[M qM (q gq)]Fq}.0 1 1 2
Using proposition 1, the above expression becomes
¯(1 a)p p (1 a)[M M (1 g)]q0 1 2
M M (1 g) (M M g)1 2 1 2
 j j  j jq u q u2 2
M2
¯p (1 a)[M M (1 g)]q j j1 2 q u2
¯p (1 a)[M M (1 g)]q R.1 2
14. By contrast, in the model of Sec. IV, we assume that prices are perfectly informative about
quality.
15. As in Rock (1986), underpricing is required here to compensate uninformed investors for
participating in the IPO. However, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), the uninformed traders’
losses result from liquidity trading. Beatty and Ritter (1986) document a positive relation between
IPO underpricing and ex ante uncertainty, as in our model.
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This gives the following relation for the determination of the IPO price:
R
¯p p [M M (1 g)]q . (5)0 1 2 1 a
The second term of equation (5) represents the underpricing of the IPO. It is
easy to see that underpricing is positively related to the fraction of equity
retained by the firm.16
C. Going Public Decision
We now consider the question of whether the firm should go public or remain
private. As before, suppose the market conjectures that the type of firm that
goes public is equal to . Let the firm’s true type be , where . If¯ ¯q q ip H, Li
the firm goes public, the firm’s entrepreneur of type receives a payoff equal¯qi
to
ˆ ˆwp (1 a)p  a[M qM (q gq)]. (6)0 1 2
That is, the entrepreneur receives the proceeds from the IPO at a price of p0
plus the value of the retained equity, depending on the consumer’s perception,
, of firm quality.qˆ
The entrepreneur is assumed to be risk-averse with a negative exponential
utility function of wealth, , where r is the constant co-u(w)p  exp (rw)
efficient of absolute risk aversion. Given that both and q are normallyqˆ
distributed, it is well known that expected utility maximization is equivalent
to maximizing the following function:
ˆ ˆ ¯U(public)p (1 a)p  aE[M qM (q gq)Fq ]0 1 2 i
2ra
ˆ ˆ ¯ Var [M qM (q gq)Fq ]. (7)1 2 i2
From proposition 1, we have
1 jq
ˆ ¯qp (q q) u,
2 2ju
in which case the value of the firm can be written as
¯q q
ˆ ˆM qM (q gq)p [M M (2 g)]  (M M g)1 2 1 2 1 22 2
jq
 (M M g) u.1 2 2ju
Evaluating the expectation and variance in equation (7) then gives
16. James and Wier (1990) have examined the relation between underpricing and the proportion
of insider shares sold.
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a
¯ ¯U(public)p (1 a)[M M (1 g)]q R {[M M (2 g)]q1 2 1 2 i2
2ra
2
¯ (M M g)q} Kj , (8)1 2 q4
where . Expected utility is inter-2Kp [M M (2 g)](M M g) 2M1 2 1 2 2
preted as consisting of the value of the equity that is sold through the IPO
less the cost of underpricing plus the value of retained equity, which is reduced
by the cost of nondiversification.
Alternatively, if the firm remains private, consumers will learn that the firm
chose not to go public. Suppose that type chose not to go public. Then, sinceq
the entrepreneur retains all the equity in the firm, the entrepreneur’s wealth
is
wp M qM (q gq).1 2
The entrepreneur’s expected utility can therefore be derived as
r
2 2
¯U(private)p (M M g)qM q  M j . (9)1 2 2 i 2 q2
We are now ready to state the entrepreneur’s problem. The entrepreneur of
type chooses to go public if and only if (private). In doing¯q U(public) ≥ Ui
so, a comparison is made between any potential pricing benefits or losses,
the cost of underpricing, and a comparison of the risks incurred. Going public
carries risk only to the extent that some degree of equity is retained and the
value of that equity is affected by randomness in the market price. Remaining
private also carries risk, however, since more equity is retained and the quality
is still uncertain.
D. Separating Equilibria
We now solve for the existence of a family of signaling equilibria in which
the high-type firm, , goes public and the low-type firm remains private.¯qH
The existence of such equilibria is possible because the high-type firm is
willing to pay the cost of IPO underpricing if it means that its high expected
quality is communicated to consumers who then pay higher prices for the
product. By contrast, the low-expected-quality firm is unwilling to go public,
because, although this communicates positive information to the market, the
speculator knows the true quality and causes prices to reflect partly his inside
information.
A standard signaling game is considered in which the informed entrepreneur
moves first by choosing whether to go public and, if so, what level of equity
to retain. Based on this action, the financial market establishes beliefs and
therefore prices the equity that is offered.
Proposition 2. Suppose that
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r
2 2 2
ˆ(M M g)Dq R Ka  2M j ≥ 0 (10)( )1 2 2 q4
and
1 r
2 2(M M g)Dq R K 2M j ! 0, (11)( )1 2 2 q2 4
where and . Then there¯ ¯ ˆDqp q  q ap 2M /[M M (2 g)]  (0, 1)H L 2 1 2
exists a family of separating signaling equilibria in which the high-type firm
goes public with equity retention, , while the low-type∗a ≤ a ≤ min (a , 1)H
firm remains private, where a* and aH are, respectively, defined by
∗a ∗(M M g) 1 Dq (1 a )M Dq( )1 2 22
r ∗2 2 2 R Ka  2M j p 0 (12)( )2 q4
and
r
2 2 2(M M g)Dq R Ka  2M j p 0. (13)( )1 2 H 2 q4
Proof. See Section II of the appendix.
Proposition 2 presents sufficient conditions for existence of a separating
equilibrium in which the high type goes public with equity retention at least
equal to a*, while the low type remains private.17 To have existence of this
equilibrium, the cost to the high type from going public, incurring the risk
of retained equity and paying the cost of underpricing must be sufficiently
small. Simultaneously, the low type’s benefits from being mispriced and laying
off risk by selling equity must be less than the loss resulting from underpricing.
The essential reason why both conditions can hold is that the informed spec-
ulator prevents the gains from mispricing to the low type from being as large
as the gains to the high type from revealing itself through the IPO process.
If the high type offers too much equity, the gains from mispricing to the low-
type firm would be too great.
It is worth noting the critical importance that consumers react to the in-
formation contained in the stock price. Suppose instead that consumers based
their purchase decisions only on whether the firm went public. Then, the
benefit to going public would be the same for both the high- and low-quality
firms. Since the cost of going public (underpricing) is also identical, a sep-
arating equilibrium would fail to exist.
The most significant empirical prediction arising from this proposition is
17. Using Pareto dominance, or one of the other equilibrium refinements, it is easy to see that
the efficient equilibrium has the high type’s equity retention identically equal to a*.
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the fact that a firm that has undergone an IPO provides an important signal
of quality to consumers. This signal is informative even before the stock price
becomes available. As mentioned in the introduction, we would expect quality-
driven IPOs for industries where new products are being introduced simul-
taneously with the IPO. Obviously this is most applicable to the high tech-
nology area in which new products are constantly being introduced and where
quality is difficult to ascertain directly.
There are a number of other empirical predictions that are also embodied
in this proposition. First, a sufficient amount of equity retention is a necessary
condition. Although equity retention seems to be counter to the aspect of
going public, it still is critical. Thus, we would not expect to observe quality-
driven IPOs in which the entrepreneurs are selling out entirely. Second, going
public requires a sufficiently large market size in the first period. Essentially,
the critical condition is that the degree of information asymmetry about quality
known to the firm must be greater than the amount of information learned
by the speculator for the second period. Hence, this prediction of the model
implies that for the listing decision to provide information, the potential spec-
ulative profits cannot be too large.
With respect to the impact of network externalities, as g increases, condition
(10) is more easily satisfied, which means that firms in such industries are
more likely to go public. In addition, from equation (12), the required equity
retention on going public must be greater for such firms. This occurs because
with network externalities the potential benefits of misrepresenting quality by
going public are greater than in the absence of such effects.
Finally, we examine the impact of risk aversion in the equilibrium. As in
Leland and Pyle (1977), risk aversion affects both high and low types in
similar ways. Risk-averse entrepreneurs who sell equity through the IPO are
able to diversify their holdings. This provides a benefit. However, when selling
equity in the market, the retained equity is subjected to market risks, such as
the noise traders in the model. Since this affects consumer perceptions and,
thereby, second-period profits, going public also carries a cost. Which one of
these two offsetting aspects dominates depends on the required level of equity
retention. Since the impact of risk aversion is identical for both types for a
given level of equity retention, the nature of the equilibrium is driven by the
other benefits and costs. The only major difficulty introduced by the existence
of risk aversion is that if the retained equity required to prevent mimicking
by the low type is too costly for the high type because of lack of portfolio
diversification, then the separating equilibrium would fail to exist. Conditions
(10) and (11) ensure that this is not the case.
In Section III, we turn to a model of competition in the product market.
This allows us to derive results on stock price reactions of competitive firms
and to study possible “hot issue” markets and correlation of IPO decisions
among firms in the same industry.
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III. Product Market Competition
We now extend the previous results to consider product market competition.
The model of competition we use is a simple market share model, which
assumes that consumers trade off quality against a search cost based on their
location. As a result, the higher-quality firm will obtain higher market share.
Profits are an increasing function of both market share and market size. An
alternative model using Bertrand competition is analyzed in Section IV.
Suppose that there are two firms (indexed by I and E) competing on the
line segment [0, 2]. Firm E is the entrant located at zero, and firm I is the
incumbent located at two.18 Consumers are uniformly distributed on the line
segment, and each of them demands one unit of a good produced by either
firm E or firm I. Consumers incur a transportation cost, T, per unit distance
traveled. To simplify the exposition, we assume that .19 Market struc-Tp 1/2
ture is captured by monopolistic competition such that the firms produce
differentiated products and take prices as given. Given monopolistic com-
petition, prices can be normalized to one without loss of generality. In Section
IV, a related model is developed in which prices are strategically chosen by
the entrant and incumbent firms.
Market size in periods 1 and 2, respectively, is represented by the magnitude
or density of consumers, M1 and M2. In accordance with Section II, we assume
that M1 is known to both the entrant and the incumbent firm, but not to the
outside financial market, ex ante. As a result, the IPO process may commu-
nicate some information about market size as well as quality to the financial
market. This will enable the model to make richer predictions about the stock
price reactions of the incumbent firm when it is publicly traded. For the second
period only the expected market size, M2, is known by both the financial
market and the firms.
Information about the first-period market size is characterized as follows.
Before the IPO the financial market regards the consumer density to be uni-
formly distributed with mean and support , where¯¯ ¯M [M  s(n), M  s(n)]1 1 1
n is the number of firms that will be publicly traded after the IPO. Thus s(n)
represents the incremental information associated with revelation of infor-
mation about market size in the nth firm’s prospectus. The support variable,
s(n) can depend on the number of firms that have gone public. This assumption
embodies the viewpoint that the financial market expects no increase in market
size from the IPO process itself on an ex ante basis. However, the resolution
of uncertainty, as represented by the variance of the ex ante distribution, may
depend on the number of firms that are publicly listed. For example, if the
initial prospectus reveals more information about market size than do sub-
18. Although we describe E as an entrant, this is mainly for the purpose of distinguishing it
from the incumbent. The entrant firm always competes with the incumbent. The distinction is
that the entrant has the discretionary decision on whether to undergo an IPO or not, in contrast
to the incumbent, which has already decided.
19. We have also solved the model for general T and discuss this in Sec. V.
IPOs and Product Quality 389
sequent prospectuses, . By contrast, there may be certain industriess(1) 1 s(2)
in which confirming information in the second prospectus may convey more
incremental information than the first prospectus. In such a case, .s(1) ! s(2)
Although the market size variable is private information to both firms, we
shall not consider strategic implications in revealing this variable as part of
the IPO process; rather, we shall assume that the market size is revealed
truthfully at the time of the IPO process.
As before, the entrant has expected product quality drawn from the sameE¯qi
discrete distribution as before: . The true product quality of theE¯ ¯ ¯q  {q , q }i L H
entrant is normally distributed with mean and variance . Because theE 2¯q ji q
incumbent firm has been in existence for some time and because the product
is an experience good, we assume that the incumbent firm’s product quality,
, is known to all.20 There are two cases to be considered depending onIq
whether the incumbent is a publicly listed firm or not.
A. Incumbent Is Publicly Listed
Suppose that the entrant goes public. All agents update their beliefs to
. The market size in this case becomes known to be M1.E E¯q p E q Fpublic( )
In the first period, the true quality of the entrant is not known, but consumers
can observe the stock price, , from which the true product quality of theEp1
entrant is inferred to be . To derive the respective market shares, considerEqˆ
the consumer at some point along the line segment that is exactly indifferent
between purchasing from the incumbent with quality qI or from the entrant
with expected quality . Define the location of this consumer to be equal toEqˆ
. Then p1 must satisfyp  [0, 2]1
1 1
E Iqˆ  p p q  (2 p ).1 12 2
Solving for yieldsp1
I E
ˆp p 1 q  q .1
Throughout the article we focus on the case in which both firms’ market
shares are strictly positive, that is, . Because prices are normalized0 ! p ! 21
to one, M1p1 represents the first-period profit of the entrant. That is, it is equal
to the market size less the difference between the quality of the incumbent
and the perceived quality of the entrant.
In the second period, the true quality, , of the entrant becomes publiclyEq
known as in the single-firm model. Analogous to the model in Section II, we
assume that because of a network externality effect, the consumer in the second
period also values the market share from the first period. This is represented
20. Actually it does not matter whether the incumbent firm’s quality is perfectly known, in
the case where it is either public or private. The critical assumption is that no information about
the incumbent firm’s quality is revealed by the decision of the entrant to go public.
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as an increase in willingness to pay via a coefficient, g/2, times the market
share from the previous period, p1.21
The location of the marginal consumer, p2, who is indifferent between
buying from the entrant and the incumbent is now given by
g 1 g 1
E Iq  p  p p q  (2 p ) (2 p ).1 2 1 22 2 2 2
Solving for p2 yields
I E E I
ˆp p 1 q  q  g(q  q ).2
The entrant’s expected second-period profit is equal to the expected market
size times the unit profit, or M2p2.
Therefore, by comparison with the single-firm case, the product market
competition case has a similar entrant profit structure in both the first and
second periods, with the addition of the terms in the first period andI1 q
in the second period, representing the market size minus theI1 (1 g)q
amount captured by the incumbent. Thus, essentially the same analysis as in
Section II can be used to derive the functional form of the analogous stock
market equilibrium. Further, since the incumbent’s quality is always known
when it is publicly traded, this does not affect the decision of the entrant to
go public. Following an almost identical approach to the analysis of the single-
firm case, we can therefore derive existence of separating equilibria. In order
to simplify the exposition at this point, we assume risk neutrality on the part
of the entrepreneur.
Proposition 3. If the entrepreneur is risk neutral, there exists a family
of separating signaling equilibria in which the high-type firm goes public with
equity retention, , while the low type remains private if and only if∗a ≥ a
(M M g)Dq ≥ R (14)1 2
and
1 (M M g)Dq ! R, (15)1 22
where and¯ ¯Dqp q  qH L
R (M M g)Dq/21 2∗a p 1 (16)[M /2M (1 g/2)]Dq.1 2
21. In this formulation, the network externality occurs with a lag of one period. Thus, the
model does not contain the typical sort of coordination problems encountered in models with
rational expectations. We have investigated alternative specifications in which network exter-
nalities are simultaneous. One such specification is where some consumers buy in the first period
but enjoy benefits for 2 periods, and other consumers only purchase and enjoy benefits for the
second period.
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Proof. See Section III of the appendix.
Therefore, the qualitative features of the separating equilibrium are identical
to those in the single-firm case. However, because of the assumption of risk
neutrality, we are able to derive a somewhat sharper prediction about the
existence of a separating equilibrium as compared to that in proposition 2.
Conditions (14) and (15), analogous to conditions (10) and (11), are both
necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium to exist. Also the threshold a* for
retained equity given by equation (16) can be solved for analytically.
B. Announcement Effects
The preceding analysis can be used to consider the impact on the stock price
of the incumbent firm when the entrant decides to make an IPO. Let us begin
by solving for the ex ante probability that the entrant decides to go public.
We make the following assumption on the support, s(2), of the uniform dis-
tribution on M1:
2R R
¯ ¯M M g 1 s(2) 1 M M g . (17)1 2 1 2
Dq Dq
The lower bound on the support, s(2), ensures that the support is wide enough
so that there is some probability that the market size realization is sufficiently
low that the high-type entrant decides not to go public for certain states of
nature from condition (14). The upper bound ensures that the support is not
so large that the retained equity in a separating equilibrium would be larger
than unity.
Given this assumption, the probability, p*, that the high-type entrant goes
public is equal to the probability that the market sizes are not too small, that
is,
∗p p prob[(M M g)Dq ≥ R].1 2
Using the uniform support, it can be shown that
¯1 R (M M g)Dq1 2∗p p  . (18)
2 2s(2)Dq
For the incumbent firm, it is of interest to look at announcement effects
associated with a declaration of the entrant to go public. Before the entrant
makes any decision, the expected value of the entrant’s quality and the first-
period expected market size are and , respectively.E ¯¯ ¯E(q )p (q  q )/2 ML H 1
Therefore, the incumbent’s ex ante profits are given by
I I E I E
¯U p M [1 q  E(q )]M {1 (1 g)[q  E q ]}. (19)( )1 2
When the entrant decides to go public, the incumbent’s profits become
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I I E
¯U (public)p E(M Fpublic)(1 q  q )1
I E
¯M [1 (1 g)(q  q )]. (20)2
Subtracting equation (19) from equation (20) yields
I I I E
¯
¯U (public) U p [E(M Fpublic)M ](1 q  q )1 1
E E
¯
¯ [M M (1 g)][E(q ) q ]. (21)1 2
Substituting the form of the separating equilibrium, , andE E¯ ¯q p q E q p( )H
and simplifying equation (21) gives the following condition on¯ ¯(q  q )/2H L
the profits of the incumbent firm:
I I I
¯
¯U (public) U p [E(M Fpublic)M ](1 q  q )1 1 H
Dq
¯ [M M (1 g)] . (22)1 2 2
Therefore, the impact on profits of the incumbent depends on two offsetting
effects. First, the fact that the entrant goes public implies that the expected
market size in the first period is larger. This affects the incumbent’s profits
in a positive direction in the first term of equation (22). By contrast, the entrant
is now known to have a high-quality product, and this causes a negative
impact on the incumbent’s first- and second-period profits as indicated by the
second term on the right-hand side of equation (22). The net impact depends
on which effect outweighs the other.
We can now use the above relation, equation (22), along with ex ante
expectations by the financial market to solve for the announcement effect from
the entrant’s decision. This is recorded in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the support of the market size distribution
is sufficiently wide, that is, equation (17) is satisfied. Then the expected stock
price reaction of the incumbent firm to the announcement that the entrant
plans to go public is positive if and only if
¯s(2) R M M g M Dq1 2 2I I
¯ ¯ 1 q  q  1 q  q  1 0. (23)( ) ( )H L[ ]2 2Dq 2 2
Proof. Using the information that the entrant has gone public, the financial
market will compute conditional expectations of the market size as follows:
1 R
¯E(M Fpublic)p M  s(2) M g . (24)1 1 2[ ]2 Dq
Substituting this term into equation (22) yields the condition in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 shows that average announcement effects depend critically
on the variance of the market size increment distribution, measured by s(2),
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the respective market shares of the incumbent firm conditional on the two
types of firms, and the separation between the two expected qualities, .22Dq
If the support of the market size distribution is sufficiently wide, then we will
observe positive announcement effects on the incumbent firm. This happens
because the fact that the entrant goes public indicates that the lower tail of
the prior distribution on market size has been truncated, and thus beliefs are
revised in a positive direction. By contrast, if the support is narrow, then there
is relatively little positive information communicated by the entrant’s decision
to go public, and the incumbent is worse off because of the revelation about
the entrant’s quality.
This analysis is consistent with the empirical results of Ward (1997), who
observed a correlation between the announcement effect of a rival (incumbent)
and the extent of underpricing at the onset of secondary trading. In fact, the
stock price reaction of a competitor firm on announcement of the IPO was
strongly negatively correlated with the extent of eventual underpricing. If
greater underpricing is associated with the competitive strength of the IPO
firm (entrant), then this could be an indication that the market share effect
dominates the market size effect. By contrast, when underpricing is nonex-
istent, this may indicate a weak entrant, and, therefore, the market size impact
dominates.
Another way of testing proposition 4 might be to differentiate among IPOs
by the length of time the incumbent has been publicly held. One might expect
long-term incumbents to have communicated most of the information about
market size, so that most of the announcement effect would be associated
with changes in market share. However, we would expect a greater likelihood
of positive announcement effects on the rival firm when it has been listed for
a shorter period of time.
C. Incumbent Is Privately Held
We now turn to the analysis when the incumbent is a privately held firm and
the entrant can decide whether to go public. This case is similar to the previous
case with the following change. The major effect is that the distribution of
the market size increment may be different from the situation when the in-
cumbent is publicly traded. We use this difference to develop a theory of how
the entrant’s incentives to go public are correlated with the incumbent’s pres-
ence as a publicly traded or privately held firm.
Suppose that the entrant goes public. All agents update their beliefs to
. In the first period, the true quality of the entrant is notE E¯q p E(q Fpublic)
known, but consumers can observe the stock price, , from which the trueEp1
product quality of the entrant is inferred to be . Given these inferences, theEqˆ
market shares of the incumbent and entrant can be derived and used to define
22. Note that we have assumed that each firm’s expected market share is strictly positive,
which requires , from the incumbent’s point of view. Thus, the first term on theI ¯1 q  q 1 0H
right-hand side in eq. (23) is positive.
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a stock market equilibrium. The functional form of the stock market equilib-
rium is exactly the same as in the case of the publicly traded incumbent.
Similarly, the incentives of the entrepreneur and the conditions for existence
of a separating signaling equilibrium can be derived.
The only difference between the going public decision of the entrant when
the incumbent is privately held as opposed to being public is dependent on
whether the prior distribution of the market size differs from the case in which
the incumbent firm is public. The support of the distribution if the incumbent
firm is private is defined by . As before we assume that¯ ¯[M  s(1), M  s(1)]1 1
2R R
¯ ¯M M g 1 s(1) 1 M M g .1 2 1 2
Dq Dq
Using this fact the probability that the high-type entrant goes public when
the incumbent is private, p**, is equal to
¯1 R (M M g)Dq1 2∗∗p p  . (25)
2 2s(1)Dq
Considering the difference between p** and p* and substituting for R from
proposition 3 leads to the following proposition on the likelihood of the entrant
to go public as related to the status of the incumbent.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the support of the market size distribution
is smaller when the incumbent firm is publicly traded than when it is not,
that is, . Then, if the prior belief on initial market size is sufficientlys(1) 1 s(2)
large relative to the second period market size,
M j j2 q u
¯M M g 1 , (26)1 2 2Dq
the entrant is more likely to go public given that the incumbent has gone
public.
This proposition shows that the critical difference between a privately held
incumbent and one whose stock is publicly traded relates to the amount of
residual uncertainty about market size and about the relative sizes of the first-
period and second-period market. If the prior on the first-period market size,
, is large relative to M2, then if we get hot issue markets. This¯M s(1) 1 s(2)1
corresponds to a situation where the initial prospectus reveals more infor-
mation about initial market size than a subsequent prospectus. We believe this
assumption to be reasonable whenever the marginal amount of information
declines with the issuance of a subsequent prospectus.23
The analysis of this subsection may indicate why in some industries hot
issue markets occur, while in other industries there is a lack of correlation
23. By contrast, it can be shown that, whenever the above condition on information is reversed,
then hot issue markets obtain only if the initial market size is small relative to the second-period
market size.
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between IPOs. We can interpret equation (26) in proposition 5 as applying
whenever the expected gain of the high-type entrant from going public is
greater than the loss because of underpricing of the IPO. From this condition,
investors will expect the high-type entrant to go public. Such an expectation
will be more likely to be true the more precise the information held by investors
(i.e., the narrower the support of the market size). Thus, we would see a hot
issue market if investors initially expect firms to go public and the information
contained in various prospectuses confirms investors’ expectations. By con-
trast, if beliefs about initial market size are pessimistic, investors do not expect
the high-type entrant to go public. In order for a hot issue market to occur,
these expectations would have to be reversed. This could only happen if there
is relatively more information contained in a subsequent prospectus.
The result of proposition 5 also indicates that network externality effects
imply a greater tendency toward hot issue markets. This happens because the
gains from signaling product quality are larger because of the importance of
initial consumer perceptions in future consumption purchase decisions.
IV. A Model of Competitive Dynamics
In Section IV we develop a model of competitive dynamics between the
incumbent and entrant firm in which the alternative to going public involves
communicating quality through prices. Although the model features a “reduced
form” specification of the stock market equilibrium considered in previous
sections, the basic features are preserved. Specifically, we assume now that
if a firm goes public, the presence of market analysts ensures that the quality
is revealed perfectly through the stock price.
In the model in this section, we compare two alternatives. In the first
alternative, an entrant can go public, and, since its quality is then known to
consumers through the stock price, a high-quality entrant can choose its first-
best (full-information) profit-maximizing price. In the second alternative, if
the entrant does not go public, a high-quality firm must signal by charging a
higher price for its product in the first period. We compare the two alternatives
from the standpoint of the high-quality entrant and determine under what
market conditions the IPO method leads to higher 2-period profits than does
the price-signaling method.
A. Model Structure
Consider, as in Section III, an entrant and an incumbent firm, whose quality,
, is already known. We define as the perceived product quality of theI Eˆq q
entrant and as the true product quality of the entrant. An entrant firm isEq
either of quality (high) or . That is, there is no remaining uncertaintyE Eq qH L
in quality levels once or is known.E Eq qH L
Preferences over product quality are specified in a manner consistent with
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Bagwell and Riordan (1991). Consumers purchase at most one unit and are
of heterogeneous types, uniformly distributed with preferences given by
E E E
¯
ˆV p V vq  p , (27)1 1
if the product is purchased from the entrant in the first period, where v is
uniformly distributed in the [0, 1] interval; is the price paid; and is aE ¯p V1
constant. In this formulation, consumers have varying degrees of preference
for product quality depending on v. If the product is purchased from the
incumbent firm, preferences are given by
I I I
¯V p V vq  p , (28)1 1
where is the price charged by the incumbent firm.Ip1
In the second period, consumer preferences depend, as in Section II, on
the true quality, , and on the quality as perceived by consumers in the firstEq
period. That is,
g
E E E I E
¯
ˆV p V vq  (q  q ) p , (29)2 22
where is the price charged by the entrant in the second period. Similarly,Ep2
preferences over products purchased from the incumbent are described by
g
I I I E I
¯
ˆV p V vq  (q  q ) p . (30)2 22
The interpretation is that there is a network externality effect represented by
the term involving g. If the perceived quality of the entrant is higher in the
first period, consumers have a greater propensity to purchase from the entrant
in the second period.
We consider the following assumptions on firm costs and qualities. The
incumbent produces with constant marginal cost, equal to c. The high-quality
entrant has constant marginal cost equal to 0, while the low-quality entrant
has constant marginal cost equal to c, the same as for the incumbent firm.24
In addition, we assume that the quality of the incumbent’s product and that
of the low-quality entrant are identical, . This implies that under full-E Iq p qL
information Bertrand competition and without a network externality effect, if
the entrant firm is of low quality, the incumbent and entrant both earn zero
profits. By contrast, when the entrant’s quality is high, then they compete as
a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, with the entrant charging a higher price
than the incumbent and also getting a higher market share. Define the dif-
24. The assumption that marginal costs of the low-quality entrant and incumbent are equal
simplifies the analysis greatly without compromising the implications. With this cost structure,
pricing below marginal cost is a signal of quality. Alternatively, if costs for the high-quality
entrant were greater than those for the low-quality entrant, then signaling with prices above
marginal cost would be optimal.
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ference in quality between the high- and low-quality entrant as EDqp q H
.
EqL
B. Quality Communication through the IPO
With the IPO method, quality is revealed perfectly through the secondary
stock market price. Section IV of the appendix derives the functional form
of prices and profits for the entrant of type t in period i, , in a BertrandEpti
equilibrium.
Using the profit functions, equations (A22) and (A24) in Section IV of the
appendix, the necessary conditions can be derived for a separating equilibrium
in which the high-quality entrant goes public and the low-quality entrant
remains private. Consistent with the analysis of Section II, we assume that
there is a fixed cost, R, of going public. As in equation (7), the utility of the
entrant that goes public is equal to
E EU(public)p (1 a)p  a(p  p ) R, (31)0 t1 t2
where the true type of the entrant, and p0 is the conjectured 2-tp H, L,
period profit of the type that goes public. If, as will be investigated below,
the market conjectures that the high-quality firm goes public, then
E Ep p p  p . (32)0 H1 H2
We show in the following proposition that there exists a separating equilibrium
in which the high-quality entrant goes public and the low-quality entrant
remains private.
Proposition 6. There exists a family of separating equilibria in which
the high-quality entrant goes public with retained equity , while the∗a ≥ a
low-quality firm remains private if and only if
1 1
2 2(2Dq c) (M M ) [(2 g)Dq c] M  cM ≥ R, (33)1 2 2 19Dq 9Dq
where
R∗a p 1 . (34)E Ep  pH1 H2
Proof. See Subsection IVA of the appendix.
Proposition 6 is similar in nature to proposition 3. If sufficient equity is
retained, the low-quality firm has no incentive to go public since the gain
from possible mispricing is limited to only a small fraction of the firm. Equa-
tion (33) is the analog of condition (14). As long as the cost of going public
is not too large, the high-quality firm will have an incentive to do so in order
to avoid having to choose too low a price in the first period, and, in addition,
giving up the network externality benefits in the second period. Based on the
comparative static effects discussed earlier, it is easy to see that the amount
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of equity retained to support the separating equilibrium is increasing in the
quality difference, Dq, as well as the network externality parameter, g.
Moreover, the critical condition for existence of a separating equilibrium
provides further support for the competitive models of the previous sections.
From examination of condition (33), it can be shown that the comparative
static effect of decreases in marginal cost, c, makes condition (33) easier to
satisfy. That is, as the marginal cost distribution becomes more uniform in
the industry, separation by going public is more easily accomplished. One
would expect that industries characterized by low marginal costs have, there-
fore, greater tendencies to go public. Second, it is apparent that growth in
market size interacts with the degree of network externalities. If , thegp 0
size of the market in the second period does not affect the ability of the high-
quality firm to use an IPO to signal quality. However, the larger g is, the
easier is condition (33) to satisfy, and, therefore, growth in the market becomes
more important.
C. Signaling through Price
As has been discussed above, high-quality firms may be motivated to go
public despite having to pay the costs of doing so, such as flotation costs,
transaction fees, and underpricing of the new issue. Alternatively, we explore
the consequences of high-quality firms using product price, itself, to signal
quality. The analysis of this situation is based on Saloner (1987).
In a separating equilibrium with price as a signal, the low-type firm must
be precluded from choosing the price selected by the high-type firm in the
first period. In the second period, we assume that quality has been revealed.
Along the equilibrium path, the price charged by the low-quality firm is
therefore , and profits are . Along the separatingE E E Ep p p p c p p p p 0L1 L2 L1 L2
equilibrium path, the high-quality firm will choose a price in the second period,
, equal to the full information price, and will obtain profit given by equationEpH2
(A22) in Section IV of the appendix. In the first period, the high-quality firm
must charge a price, , that deters the low-quality firm from mimicking.EpH1
Proposition 7 determines the pricing policy of the high-quality firm under
these assumptions.
Proposition 7. The high-quality firm charges a price equal to
gM2Ep p c Dq, (35)H1 M1
and it achieves 2-period realized profit of
gM 12E 2p p c Dq M  [(2 g)Dq c] M . (36)H 1 2( )M 9Dq1
Proof. See Subsection IVB of the appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that in a price-signaling equilibrium the high-quality
firm will price below marginal cost, thereby making it costly for the low-
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quality firm to mimic since its first-period profits will be negative. In this case
it is apparent from equation (35) that the high-quality firm suffers a negative
externality from the presence of the low-quality firm that is exacerbated by
the inclusion of the network externality effect. This occurs because when
network externalities are present, the low type is more willing to suffer a
negative profit in order to capture a higher profit in the subsequent period.
Further, the growth in the market size also affects the high-quality firm in a
negative manner, as does the degree of information asymmetry (Dq).
D. Comparison of the Signaling Methods
We now compare the IPO and price-signaling equilibria. It is first worth noting
that, if the difference in marginal costs between the high-quality entrant and
incumbent, c, is low, the high-quality firm may wind up with a negative profit
in equation (36). Thus, the IPO represents the obvious alternative in such
cases.
When both separating equilibria exist, the welfare comparison of the two
methods of signaling quality is simplified since in both equilibria the low-
quality firm obtains zero profits in both periods. Moreover, the high-quality
firm obtains the full-information profit level given by equation (A22) in the
second period. Therefore, from the entrant’s standpoint, the only difference
between the methods is represented in the initial profit levels.25 Proposition
8 indicates the conditions under which the entrant is better off by signaling
quality through the IPO as opposed to using a pricing strategy.
Proposition 8. The high-quality entrant is better off using an IPO than
by competing against an incumbent in a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric
information whenever
1 gM22(2Dq c) M  R ≥ c Dq M . (37)1 1( )9Dq M1
Proof. Equation (37) is obtained using propositions 6 and 7. Q.E.D.
First, proposition 8 shows that if both an IPO and a price-separating equi-
librium exist, the high-quality entrant is more likely to be better off in the
IPO equilibrium whenever the network externality effect is larger. This is
because network externalities make it more difficult for the low type to signal
through the public offer but make it more willing to misrepresent through
pricing in the price-signaling situation.
Second, proposition 8 indicates that higher-quality firms are better off when
the growth in market size, is larger, or if the costs of going public areM /M2 1
smaller.
Third, the cost difference in the industry also plays an important role in
determining which method would be preferred. It is easy to see that when c
25. The incumbent always prefers the IPO separating equilibrium because it obtains positive
profits in both periods in a Bertrand equilibrium if the entrant is of high type, but zero profits
always in the price-signaling equilibrium.
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is reduced, the IPO method is better. Once again, this points to the notion
that for industries that are characterized by strong degrees of asymmetric
information, but for which marginal costs are relatively less important than
fixed costs, going public is a viable method of communicating product quality
to consumers.
V. Conclusions and Empirical Implications
In this article, we have examined the implications of the going-public decision
on the product and financial markets. An important aspect that we have con-
sidered is the interaction between the two markets: the financial market price
incorporates information about potential profits arising from consumer de-
mand, and the product market relies on information communicated through
the stock price.
As this article bridges the large literature between quality in product markets
and firm valuation in financial markets, a number of specific empirical im-
plications are generated. Our model provides a new interpretation of the well-
known underpricing phenomenon as an indication of unexpected high product
quality. Thus, firms that experience a large initial return should gain larger
market share in the product market than those firms that experience low initial
returns. Further, our article predicts that an IPO generates a positive price
impact on rival firms when the uncertainty about market sizes is sufficiently
large.
Our analysis also demonstrates that IPOs motivated by product market
benefits are characterized by a significant equity retention by the entrepreneur.
The prediction of our model is that for firms in high technology industries,
we should observe smaller fractions of inside equity sold at the time of the
IPO. This seems to be broadly consistent with recent observations.
The nature of cross-sectional differences across industries affects the pro-
pensity to go public. We find that signaling through IPOs is more viable when
there exists a greater difference between expected product qualities. This ought
to be true in high technology industries. We also should expect to observe
greater tendencies to go public for industries where the firms themselves have
greater confidence about their private information regarding their own product
quality, as opposed to requiring outside verification by security analysts. When
network externalities are significant, procyclical growth becomes more im-
portant, that is, high growth rates make a firm more likely to go public.
Our model also contains a number of implications about the existence of
hot issue IPO markets and cyclical behavior. We found that the critical factor
is how much uncertainty is resolved concerning the overall size of the market.
If priors are that initial market size is important and the initial prospectus of
the first firm going public reveals relatively more information than the sub-
sequent IPOs, then we predict that IPOs in such industries will occur in
“waves.” The article also proposes an explanation for the interesting puzzle
documented in Ritter (1998) concerning the positive association between in-
IPOs and Product Quality 401
itial IPO returns and subsequent hot issue markets. From proposition 3, going
public in the face of large underpricing implies that the prospective benefits
in terms of signaling quality are high. This then implies that the condition in
proposition 5 for existence of hot issue markets is more likely to hold.
The extent of competition can also affect firms’ decisions to become pub-
licly traded. The model of Section III can be easily extended to allow for
differential search costs. We have found that as search costs go down, rep-
resenting greater competition between the incumbent and an entrant, it is more
likely that an equilibrium exists in which high-quality firms go public. Thus,
product market competition acts in a manner similar to network externalities.
Further, we have examined the alternative of using product price directly,
instead of IPOs, in conveying information to consumers. We find that large
growth opportunities as well as network externalities imply a greater tendency
to use the IPO method instead of product price signaling. Moreover, IPOs
should be more frequent in industries characterized by small differences in
marginal production costs. For example, in the software industry the marginal
cost of “producing” an extra copy of a program may be negligible. Thus, the
marginal cost of production will be similar for all competitors. As a result,
if two software companies have developed similar products, they may be
unable to signal by pricing. For such industries the information revelation
through the stock market is therefore particularly important.
The analysis of the interaction between listing decisions and product market
considerations seems to be a fruitful direction for future research in corporate
finance. Especially in industries such as the Internet, software, pharmaceuti-
cals, and other high-tech industries, the informational role of market prices
and the resulting industrial organization effects may be particularly important.
The relevance of these issues is emphasized not only by the numbers of recent
IPOs but also by the rapid growth of international listings on stock exchanges.
Appendix
I. Proof of Proposition 1
Conjecture the following:
Conjecture 1. There exists an equilibrium demand schedule by the speculator, which
is linear in the true product quality, q:
xp a bq.
Conjecture 2. There exists an equilibrium price function that is linear in the total
demand by the speculator and the uninformed investors:
p p c d(x v u).1
Conjecture 3. Consumers employ a linear function that maps the stock price into
expected quality
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qˆp e f p .1
To verify conjecture 1, we assume that conjectures 2 and 3 hold. In this case, the
firm’s expected liquidation value given q and x is
ˆE[(M  gM )qM qFq, x]p (M  gM )[e fc fd(x v)]M q.1 2 2 1 2 2
Also, the expected price is given by
E(p Fq, x)p c d(x v).1
The speculator’s expected profits are
ˆ p E{[(M  gM )qM q p ]xFq, x}.1 2 2 1
Substituting for and , differentiating with re-ˆE[(M  gM )qM qFq, x] E(p Fq, x)1 2 2 1
spect to x, and setting the resulting expression equal to zero yields
v 1
xp  {e(M  gM ) c[1 f (M  gM )]M q}.1 2 1 2 22 2d[1 f (M  gM )]1 2
This is consistent with ifxp a bq
M2bp (A1)
2d[1 f (M  gM )]1 2
and
v 1
ap  {e(M  gM ) c[1 f (M  gM )]}. (A2)1 2 1 22 2d[1 f (M  gM )]1 2
Thus, conjecture 1 is verified given the other two conjectures.
To verify conjecture 2, we assume that conjectures 1 and 3 hold. Market efficiency
from the standpoint of the market maker requires
ˆp p E[(M  gM )qM qFy]p (e f p )(M  gM )M E(qFy).1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
By Bayes’s rule, we know that
cov(q, y)
¯E(qFy)p q [yE(y)].
var(y)
Note that and ; we havexp a bq yp x v u
2 2 2 2
¯cov(q, y)p bj , var(y)p b j  j , E(y)p a bq v.q q u
Therefore, market efficiency requires that
21 M bj2 q
¯ ¯p p e(M  gM )M q (y a bq v) .[ ]1 1 2 2 2 2 21 f (M  gM ) b j  j1 2 q u
This is consistent with ifp p c dy1
2M bj2 qdp (A3)2 2 2[1 f (M  gM )](b j  j )1 2 q u
and
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¯(M  gM )eM q1 2 2
¯cp  d(a bq v). (A4)
1 f (M  gM )1 2
This verifies conjecture 2 given the other two conjectures. Substituting equation (A3)
into equation (A1) yields
jubp . (A5)
jq
Substituting this into equation (A3) yields
M j2 qdp . (A6)
2[1 f M  gM ]j( )1 2 u
The last step is to prove conjecture 3 given conjectures 1 and 2. For consumers’
beliefs to be rational, we require that . Sinceqˆp E(qFp ) p p c d(a bq v1 1
, applying Bayes’s rule yieldsu)
2bjq
¯ ¯E(qFp )p q [p  c d(a bq v)].1 12 2 2d b j  j( )q u
This is consistent with ifqˆp e f p1
2bjqfp (A7)
2 2 2d b j  j( )q u
and
¯ ¯ep q f[c d(a bq v)]. (A8)
This verifies conjecture 3 given the other two conjectures. Substituting equations (A5)
and (A6) into equation (A7) yields
1fp . (A9)(M  gM )M1 2 2
Finally, the ex ante revenue, R, of the speculator is given by
ˆRp E(E{[(M  gM )qM q p ]xFq})1 2 2 1
jq
¯pM E (q q)x (x u)x[ ]2 2ju
M2
p j j .q u2
Q.E.D.
II. Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium is derived by considering the incentive compatibility conditions that the
high-quality firm has an incentive to go public and the low-quality firm has an incentive
to remain private. First, the high-quality firm will have an incentive to go public whenever
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, as given in equations (8) and (9), with and¯ ¯ ¯U(public) ≥ U(private) qp q p q qpi H
. This condition is expressed as¯qL
r 2 2 2IC (a){ (M M g)DqR (Ka  2M )j ≥ 0. (A10)H 1 2 2 q4
Likewise, the incentive compatibility constraint for the low-quality firm is also given
by comparing equations (8) and (9) with and :¯ ¯ ¯ ¯qp q qp q p qH i L
a
IC (a){ IC (a)M Dq [M M (2 g)]Dq ≤ 0. (A11)L H 2 1 22
Equations (12) and (13) define a* and aH, respectively, such that IC (a )pH H
. It is easily shown that and ICL(a) are both strictly decreasing∗IC (a )p 0 IC (a)L H
and concave functions of a such that ICL(a) is always steeper than . ConditionIC (a)H
(10) in the statement of the proposition is a sufficient condition for existence of aH.
Further, a sufficient condition for existence of a* is that . This is conditionIC (1) ! 0L
(11) in the statement of the proposition. Since ICL(a) and cross at only a singleIC (a)H
point, which is , it follows from condition (10) in the statement of the propositionaˆ
that . Therefore the incentive compatibility conditions that support an∗aˆ ! a ! aH
equilibrium imply that the high-quality firm is better off by going public whenever
and that the low-quality firm is better by remaining private whenevera ≤ min (a , 1)H
. Q.E.D.∗a ≥ a
III. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 is a corollary of proposition 2. Using equation (10) with yieldsrp 0
(M M g)DqR ≥ 0. (A12)1 2
This is condition (14) in the proposition. Similarly using condition (11) gives condition
(14) in the proposition. Notice that as these conditions are independent of a, they are
both necessary and sufficient for existence of a separating equilibrium. Setting rp
in equation (12) yields equation (16) in the proposition. Q.E.D.0
IV. Derivation of the Equilibrium in the Dynamic Model
We begin by identifying consumer demand for both periods. In the first period, suppose
that perceived quality . Then it is clear by comparing equations (27) andE E Iqˆ p q p qL
(28) that all consumers purchase from the firm that charges the lower price. If they
charge the same price, they divide the market in an arbitrary fashion. Therefore, the
equilibrium prices are . If , then once again comparing equationsE I E Eˆp p p p c q p qL1 1 H
(27) and (28) and using the assumption of the uniform distribution, aggregate demand
for the entrant’s products will be given by
E Ip  pH1 1ED p 1 M , (A13)1 1( )Dq
where M1 is the market size in the first period and is the difference inE IDqp q  qH
product quality. The aggregate demand for the incumbent’s products in this case is
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I ED pM D . (A14)1 1 1
In the second period, if the entrant is of low quality, there are two cases to consider.
If the entrant’s perceived quality equals the true quality in the first period, then the
analysis of aggregate demand is identical to the first period; hence, both the entrant
and incumbent price at marginal cost and earn zero profits. However, if the low-quality
entrant has managed to misrepresent its quality in the first period as a high-quality
firm, then analysis of equations (29) and (30) shows that as long as the entrant charges
a price , it can capture the entire market, that is, .E Ep ≤ gDq c D pML2 2 2
In the second period, if the entrant is of high quality, and the perceived quality
equals the actual quality in the first period, equations (29) and (30) show that the
aggregate demand is
E Ip  p  gDqH2 2ED p 1 M . (A15)2 2( )Dq
We now consider the form of equilibrium prices and market shares over the 2 periods
under full information with Bertrand competition. As has already been discussed, if
the entrant is of low quality, both the entrant and incumbent price at marginal cost
and earn zero profit in the first and second period. We now derive the prices and profit
for the Bertrand equilibrium when the entrant is of high quality.
Since consumer preferences in the first period are a special case of those in the
second period with , it suffices to derive the prices and profit functions in agp 0
Bertrand equilibrium for the second period only. The problem of the high-quality
entrant in the second period taking the price of the incumbent as given for the second
period is as follows:
E E Emax p p p D , (A16)H2 H2 2
EpH2
where is the demand for the entrant from equation (A15). This gives the reactionED2
function for the entrant as
E Ip p (1/2)(Dq gDq p ). (A17)H2 2
Similarly, the problem of the incumbent firm is
I I Emax p p p  c M D . (A18)( )( )2 H2 2 2
Ip2
The reaction function for the incumbent is
I Ep p (1/2)(p  gDq c). (A19)2 H2
Solving equations (A17) and (A19) yields the following set of equilibrium prices:
Ep p (1/3)[(2 g)Dq c] (A20)H2
and
Ip p (1/3)[(1 g)Dq 2c]. (A21)2
In order to avoid the interior price being below marginal cost, we assume that (1
. Substituting equations (A20) and (A21) into equations (A16) and (A18)g)Dq c 1 0
yields the following profit functions:
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1
E 2p p [(2 g)Dq c] M (A22)H2 29Dq
and
1I 2p p [(1 g)Dq c] M . (A23)2 29Dq
Setting gives the following profit functions for the first period:gp 0
1
E 2p p (2Dq c) M (A24)H1 19Dq
and
1I 2p p (Dq c) M . (A25)1 19Dq
A. Proof of Proposition 6
In order to derive existence of a separating equilibrium, the low-quality firm must
have an incentive to remain private. Obviously if the low-type firm were to go public,
then its price would be determined by equation (32). However, the firm recognizes
that its true profits will be zero since going public reveals quality to consumers.
Therefore, the low-type firm remains private whenever
(1a)p R ≤ 0.0
Equation (34) gives the minimal value of a such that the low-type firm remains private.
The high-quality entrant achieves utility of
E EU(public)p p p RH1 H2
by going public in a separating equilibrium, where the profits are determined as in
equations (A22) and (A24). If it remains private, there is no information that reveals
its quality to consumers in the first period. Hence, with the incumbent pricing at
marginal cost, the entrant can capture the entire market by pricing at slightly below
c. Therefore, profits of the high-quality entrant that remains private are equal to cM1
in the first period. In the second period, quality is revealed, but there is no benefit of
network externalities. Hence, the profits are given by , with . Equation (33)Ep gp 0H2
is a straightforward algebraic simplification of the condition that U (public) is greater
than by remaining private and earning the 2-period profits as described above. Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Proposition 7
In the separating equilibrium, the profit of the low-quality firm is zero in both periods.
Therefore, we need to compute the profit if it should misrepresent itself, by charging
a price equal to in the first period. In the second period, the low-quality firm willEpH1
not have an incentive to set price at marginal cost because of the market share generated
in the first period. In fact, it will set price equal to
Ep p gDq c.L2
This means that its second period profit from misrepresentation in the first period is
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Ep p gDqM .L2 2
Now moving back to the first period, if the low-quality entrant chooses a price below
marginal cost, it will attract all of the consumers since the incumbent will never select
a price less than its marginal cost. Thus, the first-period profit (loss) from misrepre-
sentation is
E Ep p p  c M .( )L1 H1 1
The condition that guarantees that the low-quality firm will not have an incentive
to mimic the high-quality firm becomes , orE Ep p ≤ 0L1 L2
Ep  c M  gDqM ≤ 0.( )H1 1 2
The Pareto dominant separating equilibrium price is given by equation (35). Equation
(36) is then obtained by adding this first-period profit, , to the full-informationEp MH1 1
profit of equation (A22). Q.E.D.
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